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WHAT 30 YEARS OF CHEVRON TEACH US ABOUT 
THE REST OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Abbe R. Gluck* 
 
Chevron, the most famous rule of administrative law, is also a central 
doctrine of statutory interpretation. But Chevron is understood and 
operates quite differently from most of the other statutory interpretation 
rules. This Essay explores six such divergences and how they illuminate of 
some the most important, unanswered questions of the statutory era.   
First, thirty years of Chevron highlight the enduring puzzle over the legal 
status of statutory interpretation methodology in general.  Chevron is a 
―precedent;‖ the remaining statutory interpretation doctrines do not even 
rise to the status of ―law.‖  But second, Chevron’s own fate is inextricably 
tied to these other rules, because Chevron relies on them in its famous two-
step test. Critics blame Chevron’s manipulability, but arguably the blame 
lies more with the legal indeterminacy of all of the other statutory 
interpretation rules upon which Chevron relies. Third, as the Chevron 
doctrine has evolved, it has become more attendant to the realities of how 
Congress drafts statutes—realities in which the Court seems wholly 
uninterested when it comes to the rest of statutory interpretation.  Relatedly, 
the Court shows no shame in acknowledging Chevron’s source; the Court 
created the doctrine.  The jurisprudential status of the other interpretive 
rules, however, remains ambiguous, with the federal courts loathe to admit 
that they have fashioned a common law of statutory interpretation.  Fourth, 
Chevron, as further developed by Mead, is the one instance in which the 
Court has explicitly used interpretive doctrine to influence the procedures 
that Congress uses. Again in contrast, across the rest of the statutory 
landscape, the Court has refused to enter the sausage factory, continuing to 
reject the idea that courts should interfere in the lawmaking process, or that 
how a law is made should affect its interpretation.  Fifth, Chevron’s 
evolution has blown a hole through conventional notions of statutory stare 
decisis, but at the same time the Court now seems afraid that it has given 
away too much. Today, agency statutory interpretations may displace 
judicial precedents but, when agencies are not in the picture, the Court 
hoards power: it gives its own statutory precedents ―super‖ stare decisis 
effect; is stingy when it comes to interpreting congressional overrides; and 
won’t cede any control over interpretive rules to any other branch.  
 
*  Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  Thanks to Peter Shane and Chris Walker for the 
invitation to participate and to Molly Alarcon, Carter Greenbaum, and Grace Heusner for 
excellent research assistance. 
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Finally—and this is a shared feature—both Chevron and the rest of the 
statutory interpretation rules rest on an outmoded, ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖ 
understanding of Congress and agencies that is no more, if it ever was.  
Thirty years of Chevron thus reveal a statutory law–landscape in 
remarkable flux, and a Court making few connections between the closely 
linked administrative and statutory domains. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 is best 
known as a key rule of administrative law, but it is also a vital doctrine of 
statutory interpretation.  Like most other interpretive doctrines, Chevron 
instructs courts how to resolve statutory ambiguity and, for that reason, 
Chevron rightfully occupies a central place in the legislation canon.  At the 
same time, however, Chevron operates very differently from virtually all of 
the other statutory interpretation rules.  Those differences, and what they 
tell us about the current state of the law of the statutory age, are the focus of 
this Essay. 
Consider the following distinctions between Chevron and the rest of the 
statutory interpretation rules.  Chevron is more of a ―doctrine‖ than the 
other interpretive principles.  It is more hinged to the realities of how 
Congress drafts.  Its application also has forced the U.S. Supreme Court to 
grapple explicitly with hard questions about the role of judicial stare decisis 
in statutory cases and, more generally, about the role of courts in the 
modern regulatory era—questions that hover, still unanswered, over the 
remaining rules of construction.  And yet, Chevron is inextricably—perhaps 
ill-fatedly—linked to these other rules, because Chevron‘s own doctrinal 
test requires the courts to consider them in every Chevron inquiry. 
These differences and connections—illuminated when one analyzes 
Chevron from a legislation, rather than from an administrative law, 
perspective—productively reveal some of the most important and 
unanswered questions of the statutory era.  Specifically, this Essay focuses 
on six doctrinal and theoretical intersections: 
First, Chevron is a ―precedent,‖ whereas the other canons of statutory 
interpretation are not treated as precedent or ―doctrine‖ of any kind.  Instead 
their legal status remains entirely ambiguous.  These other canons help to 
decide cases but are not treated as ―law.‖  Instead, they often are referred to 
as mere ―rules of thumb.‖ 
Second, Chevron itself exposes the contingency of those other canons, in 
Chevron‘s own reliance on them in its famous two-step test.  Under 
Chevron, courts must use ―traditional tools of statutory construction‖2 to 
determine if the statute is sufficiently clear to deprive agencies of 
interpretive leeway.  Law reviews are clogged with criticisms of courts‘ 
inconsistent approaches to this first-step inquiry, but the fault arguably lies 
with the wishy-washiness not of Chevron, but of those canons on which 
Chevron relies and whose fickle applications have been chronicled at least 
since Karl Llewellyn‘s famous exposition.3 
Third, Chevron embraces legislative realism and also has grappled with 
its own jurisprudential foundations in ways that other canons do not and 
 
 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 3. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950) 
(chronicling that for every canon there is a counter-canon that contradicts it). 
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have not.  Although the Court announced Chevron with a hodgepodge of 
justifications that ranged from congressional intent to agency expertise,4 the 
Court over the last decade, beginning in United States v. Mead Corp.,5 has 
explicitly re-grounded Chevron in congressional intent.6  Also in Mead, the 
Court embarked on a new effort to make delegation doctrine more 
―realistic,‖ that is, more linked to how Congress actually works and how 
Congress itself signals delegation.7  In contrast, outside of the 
administrative deference context, the Court has shown virtually no interest 
in linking how Congress really works to the rest of its interpretive doctrines 
and has been content to leave the jurisprudential bases of those doctrines 
imprecisely defined. 
Fourth, Chevron is the one instance in which the Court has explicitly 
used interpretive doctrines to influence the procedures that Congress uses.  
In Mead, the Court effectively told Congress that if it wants Chevron 
deference for its agencies, it has to delegate with formal process, and that 
agencies must use those processes rather than announce administrative 
interpretations more informally.8  Again in contrast, across the rest of the 
statutory interpretation landscape, the Court has refused to enter the sausage 
factory, continuing to reject the idea of ―due process of lawmaking‖—i.e., 
that how a law is made should affect its legitimacy or how it is interpreted 
by courts.9 
Fifth, Chevron has been at the center of a robust debate about statutory 
stare decisis.  That debate has highlighted deep tensions in how the Court 
conceives of precedent more generally in the statutory context, and also 
evinces the Court still struggling to define its role in the modern statutory 
era.  Chevron, of course, worked an enormous transfer of interpretive 
authority from courts to agencies.  But the Court went even further in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services,10 a 2005 decision that effectively liberates agencies from stare 
decisis for their own interpretations in many cases and even allows agency 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes to displace judicial precedents on those 
same questions.11  At the very same time, the Court has continued to use 
other doctrines of statutory precedent to enhance its power over other 
institutional actors, perhaps in reaction to all it has given away through the 
Chevron line of cases.  For instance, the Court applies ―super strong stare 
 
 4. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–65. 
 5. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 6. See id. at 236–37. 
 7. Id. (narrowing Chevron‘s availability to those situations in which Congress has 
signaled an intent to delegate and in so doing seeking to ―tailor deference to [the] variety‖ of 
ways in which Congress delegates). 
 8. Id. at 226–27. 
 9. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 199 (1976); cf. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN ET AL., ―DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING‖:  UNITED STATES, 
SOUTHERN AFRICA, GERMANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, (forthcoming 2014) (describing 
the lack of a ―due process of lawmaking‖ doctrine in American statutory law). 
 10. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 984–86. 
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decisis‖ to its own substantive statutory precedents,12 making them more 
deeply entrenched than ordinary decisions.  The Court also refuses to treat 
statutory interpretation principles as formal precedents, a choice that 
prevents Congress (or anyone else) from having any control over the canons 
of interpretation.13 
Sixth—and this is a parallel more than a difference—for all that 
commends Chevron, it still is almost as outdated as the rest of statutory 
interpretation doctrine.  Chevron is based on a ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖ 
version of Congress that is no more, if it ever was.  For example, Chevron 
assumes that Congress delegates to one federal agency at a time, when in 
fact Congress often delegates to multiple agencies simultaneously, not all of 
which are federal.14  Chevron also assumes that congressional drafters are 
focused on the Court‘s own doctrines, when in fact the realities of the 
legislative process are now so complex that drafters are focused on a host of 
other factors—including agencies—that have little to do with courts (if they 
ever did in the first place).15 
In the end, viewing statutory interpretation in light of thirty years of 
Chevron reveals the federal courts still finding their way, and still working 
out the nature of statutory law in the modern legal era.  We do not yet know 
what kind of precedential weight statutory interpretation doctrines carry, or 
whether they will ever be more determinate.  We do not yet have a clear set 
of foundations for the non-Chevron rules of construction themselves, but 
what we can say is that if they are supposed to reflect how Congress drafts, 
the Court is not making much of an effort toward that goal.  And perhaps 
most fundamentally, we see the Court torn between giving more power to 
agencies and hoarding it for itself.  Can we blame it?  After all, the role of 
the federal courts would be dramatically diminished if the courts ceded 
control over the world of statutes. 
Each of these Chevron differences could be the subject of its own study, 
and I have elaborated on aspects in other work.16  But considering them 
 
 12. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 
(1988); see, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) 
(adhering with ―special force‖ to a longstanding interpretation of a Court of Federal Claims 
statute of limitations). 
 13. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:  
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013). 
 14. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory 
Interpretation:  State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 
YALE L.J. 534 (2011).  For a detailed exposition of modern deviations from the textbook 
processes of both administrative law and statutory interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck, Anne 
Joseph O‘Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, U. PENN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 15. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part 
II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 767–69 (2014). 
 16. For work on the legal status of the canons, see Gluck, supra note 13; Abbe R. Gluck, 
The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States As 
Laboratories].  For work on Chevron‘s justifications and its legislative realism, see Abbe R. 
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
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together, albeit in more summary fashion, has the advantage of constructing 
a more holistic picture of the doctrines in flux, and what the next thirty 
years of Chevron and the statutory landscape have in store. 
I.   CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN THE LEGAL STATUS 
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGY 
Chevron is a legal framework used by courts to resolve questions of 
statutory ambiguity.  Like all canons and presumptions of statutory 
interpretation, Chevron is a rule that tips the scales in favor of a particular 
result when a statute is unclear.  In Chevron‘s case, the scales are tipped 
toward the agency‘s preferred interpretation.  So understood, it functions 
much like any other canon of statutory interpretation, such as the 
presumption that ambiguous statutes be construed as not preempting state 
law (the ―presumption against preemption‖)17 or the presumption that 
ambiguous statutory provisions be construed so as not to render other 
statutory provisions redundant (the ―rule against superfluities‖).18  
Administrative law experts sometimes resist this description of Chevron as 
a ―canon‖:  they think of Chevron as hard-core ―doctrine,‖ indeed, their 
central doctrine, in ways that statutory interpretation canons are not often 
understood.19  But Chevron‘s analogous role in resolving interpretive 
disputes is why legislation experts understand Chevron (properly in my 
view) as not only a central administrative law doctrine but also as another 
tool in the judicial bucket of interpretive aids.20 
This is not to say that Chevron is just any old interpretive tool.  It is the 
most cited administrative law case in history and has been referenced in 
more than 7000 cases and more than 5000 law review articles.21  Congress 
increasingly delegates more work to agencies and, as a result, the validity of 
the ―agenc[ies‘] statutory interpretation‖22 is the main issue in an enormous 
number of run-of-the-mill statutory interpretation cases. 
 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 
(2013); Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15.  For work on Chevron‘s outdated understanding 
of how Congress drafts and delegates, see Gluck, supra note 14; Abbe R. Gluck, Our 
[National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014); Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14. 
 17. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 18. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
697–703 (1995) (refusing to construe the statute in ways that would give two statutory terms 
duplicate meaning). 
 19. For statements to this effect from one of the leading administrative law textbooks, 
see PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE‘S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  CASES AND 
COMMENTS 1021 (11th ed. 2011). 
 20. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a 
Precedent:  An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010). 
 21. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:  How Chevron Has 
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 & n.6 (2010); 
see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and 
Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 & n.2 (2014). 
 22. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference:  A Preliminary 
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 524–26 (2005). 
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Chevron, however, has an entirely different legal status from the other 
interpretive principles.  With the exception of Chevron and its progeny, the 
Court does not apply what I have called ―methodological stare decisis‖—
the concept that judicial interpretive pronouncements (e.g., ―We presume 
that Congress accords the same meaning to a term used multiple times 
within the same statute‖) should be treated as precedential for the next 
statutory case.  This difference—Chevron‘s privileged status as real 
―doctrine‖—lends jurisprudential clarity to Chevron that escapes the other 
interpretive rules.  Moreover, in contrast to most of the other interpretive 
rules, there is widespread agreement about Chevron‘s source:  the Court 
created the doctrine.  And so we know the nature of the power that 
underlies it, and who can change it. 
A.   Only Chevron and Its Progeny Get Stare Decisis Effect 
As I have detailed elsewhere, there is a conspicuous absence of any kind 
of system of precedent for the entire non-administrative law–related 
landscape of statutory interpretation methodology.23  For example, even 
when a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court agrees on an interpretive 
principle in a particular case (for example, ―floor statements are not reliable 
legislative history‖ or the presumption that ambiguous bankruptcy statutes 
be construed in favor of the debtor, and so on),24 that principle is not 
viewed as ―law‖ for the next case, even when the same statute is being 
construed.  The Justices either believe that they cannot bind other Justices‘ 
(or future Justices‘) methodological choices or have implicitly concluded 
that it would not be wise to do so.25  Instead, courts and scholars routinely 
refer to these canons as ―universal‖ principles, or ―rules of thumb,‖26 a 
sharp divergence from the way in which they treat analogous decision-
making principles in other contexts—including choice-of-law rules, rules of 
contract interpretation, and even constitutional law decision-making 
regimes such as the tiers of scrutiny. 
All of the canons except Chevron and its progeny, that is.  Chevron is 
routinely referred to as a ―precedent‖ by courts and scholars alike,27 and, as 
noted, it is one of the most cited cases in history.28  Indeed, Chevron is a 
precedent that was modified by another precedent (i.e., Mead) that was 
 
 23. See Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16. 
 24. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
app. B (4th ed. 2007) (cataloguing more than 100 canons and citing references). 
 25. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:  Methodology As ―Law‖ and 
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1910 (2011). 
 26. Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (―[C]anons of construction 
are no more than rules of thumb . . . .‖); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 662 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival 
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation:  A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 199, 206 (1999).  See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
 27. See generally Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 20. 
 28. Id. at 1730–31; Beermann, supra note 21, at 782 & n.6. 
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modified by yet another precedent (i.e., Brand X).  The ―Chevron doctrine‖ 
as we talk about it today (and as I shall refer to it here) encompasses all of 
these decisions, each building upon the other.  Nothing like this exists with 
respect to the rest of the interpretive doctrines.  The Court has not, for 
example, stated that the rule against superfluities applies only in a particular 
class of situations (say, short versus long statutes or to a particular statute), 
and then applied that precedent to the next case, much less built on it with 
another doctrine.29 
The Court has no ranking of these other canons and no other process that 
determines in what order they will be applied or when.  As another 
example, the Court still has not decided—even though it has repeatedly 
debated the question—whether legislative history may be consulted to 
clarify a statute before applying a policy canon like the rule of lenity30 or 
constitutional avoidance.31  Just this past Term, the Court divided again in 
two high profile cases over the question of what threshold level of 
ambiguity is necessary to trigger the application of two of the most 
common interpretive presumptions—the federalism canon, in Bond v. 
United States,32 and lenity, in Abramski v. United States.33  We have seen 
these debates before,34 and it is virtually assured we will see them again, 
because of the absence of methodological stare decisis. 
B.   Why Chevron’s Status As ―Real Law‖ Matters 
It is a matter of highly contested opinion whether there should be 
methodological stare decisis for principles of statutory construction.35  I 
 
 29. There may be some emerging exceptions.  Most notably, the ―extraterritoriality 
canon‖—the presumption that U.S. laws do not apply abroad unless the statute explicitly so 
provides, see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)—in recent years 
seems to have taken on the status of something closer to a precedential rule than a 
presumption of statutory interpretation.  The rare progression from canon to precedent is 
worthy of separate examination, which I develop in a forthcoming work. 
 30. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009), with id. at 436–37 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the statutory ambiguity required applying the rule of 
lenity, rather than ―comb[ing] through obscure legislative history‖). 
 31. Compare, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001), with id. at 706–07 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (debating the level of ambiguity required to trigger the canon of 
constitutional avoidance). 
 32. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). Compare id. at 2090, with id. at 2094–97 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment) (debating the level of ambiguity necessary to trigger the federalism 
canon). 
 33. 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014). Compare id. at 2272 n.10, with id. at 2280–81 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (debating whether the rule of lenity should have been applied before resorting 
first to statutory purpose and history to clarify ambiguity). 
 34. Compare Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410–11 (2010), with id. at 423–34 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (debating whether the rule of 
lenity and avoidance canons could narrow an unconstitutionally broad criminal statute). See 
Hayes, 555 U.S. at 429, 436–37 (summarized supra note 30). 
 35. See Gluck, supra note 13, at 778.  Some view statutory interpretation as not a 
―science‖ but an ―art,‖ and so as requiring a more creative judicial decision-making process 
than other areas of law. Cf. generally Jerome Frank, Words and Music:  Some Remarks on 
Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1947) (comparing interpreting 
legislation to interpreting music and addressing ―judges‘ reluctance to admit their own 
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have argued elsewhere that some species of methodological stare decisis 
might ameliorate the lack of predictability associated with statutory 
interpretation.36  At a minimum, and regardless of how the stare decisis 
question is resolved, canons must have some legal status.  If they aren‘t 
precedent or ―law,‖ what are they?  It is difficult to think of any other rules 
that do so much work in judicial opinions37 whose legal status remains so 
ambiguous.  Perhaps even more surprising, the Court does not seem at all 
interested in acknowledging this ambiguity, much less in resolving it. 
One significant aspect of Chevron‘s clear legal status is that it dispels a 
common ―impossibility thesis‖—the argument that it is simply not possible 
to doctrinalize interpretive rules.  (State courts across the country have in 
fact doctrinalized many of the canons, and state legislatures have even 
passed laws about them, two developments that further dispel this 
hypothesis.38) 
Another significance of the Chevron difference is that judges and 
scholars are not evasive about ―where the rule comes from‖ as they indeed 
are with respect to the other canons.  Administrative law scholars routinely 
argue that much of administrative law, with a particular focus on Chevron, 
is judge-made common law.39  In contrast, when it comes to the other 
canons, courts suggest that they come from Blackstone,40 from ―common 
sense,‖ or from reflections of how Congress legislates (but reflections 
observed or originated by whom, no one says).41  The federal courts 
generally do not acknowledge that courts create at least some canons in the 
same way that courts created Chevron.  Yet, the presumption against 
preemption was announced in a New Deal–era case, Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp.42 in 1947.  The federalism canon was announced in 1991 in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft.43  Similarly, policy canons like the rule that 
exemptions to the tax code are narrowly construed did not come down from 
 
creativeness‖); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 527, 528 (1947); Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation As a Multifarious 
Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1559, 1578 (2010).  Many believe that judges must retain 
special interpretive flexibility in this context, and that belief may explain why most 
commentators seem content to rest with the nebulous nature of the canons‘ legal status.  It is 
worth pointing out, however, that this romanticized vision of the judicial role in statutory 
interpretation is a vision that is somewhat at odds with the positivism embraced by Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its doctrinal progeny; namely, the idea 
that law does not come from nowhere. 
 36. Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16, at 1846–55. 
 37. At least in terms of justification; the canons‘ actual effect on judicial decision 
making is difficult to determine and contested. 
 38. See generally Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16 (detailing these state 
developments). 
 39. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common 
Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012). 
 40. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29 (1997) (emphasizing 
the ―sheer antiquity‖ of lenity as a fact that justifies its application). 
 41. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 924–26. 
 42. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 43. 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991). 
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the sky, either.44  Aren‘t at least some of these canons as much ―common 
law‖ as Chevron?  To be sure, one might argue that they are more than 
common law:  for example, that canons invoking constitutional principles 
like federalism are actually constitutional law, or constitutionally derived 
―constitutional common law.‖45  The point is that, although we might divide 
over which category of ―law‖ they are, they cannot really be ―not law‖ at 
all.46 
In my view, the judicial resistance to acknowledging the common law 
status of these canons stems in large part from the consequences that would 
be attendant to such an acknowledgment.  If the canons were understood as 
common law, they might bind other judges (meaning there would, indeed 
be, methodological stare decisis)—or, even worse (from the viewpoint of 
some judges), give Congress the power to legislate over them.  In fact, 
scholars have so assumed that Congress could legislate some different 
version of Chevron.47  When it comes to the non-Chevron canons, however, 
judges have vigorously resisted the idea that legislatures can dictate the 
rules of statutory interpretation48—a position that almost certainly comes 
both from a judicial desire to retain control over these cases and also from a 
sense that these canons are somehow more ―internal‖ or personal to the 
individual judge than ordinary decision-making rules. 
One question to ask is why courts have so comfortably viewed Chevron 
as different.  It may be that more formality is necessary in the Chevron 
context because the administrative deference doctrines explicitly regulate 
interbranch relationships.  Or it may be that deference doctrines are a 
distinctly modern animal—created by modern courts to respond to the rise 
of the administrative state, whereas some (but certainly not all) of the other 
canons have applied to judicial decision making since Roman times, and 
many more were inherited from the English common law tradition.  These 
older doctrines may be more poorly tailored to the modern statutory age 
state than is Chevron. 
The distinction may also stem from the fact that Chevron functions 
slightly differently from the typical canon of statutory construction:  it does 
not aim to construe language, which is, perhaps, an inherently indeterminate 
task that requires some interpretive flexibility.  Rather, Chevron simply 
 
 44. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 24, app. B at 41 (citing United 
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)); see also United 
States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988). 
 45. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:  
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV 1, 2–3 (1975). 
 46. Some of these canons, like the rule of lenity, may have constitutional bases but, as I 
detailed in Gluck, supra note 13, that argument certainly cannot be made for all of them. 
 47. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637 
(2003); cf. Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore 
Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014) (detailing how Congress legislated Skidmore, 
rather than Chevron, deference for certain administrative preemption decisions in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012)). 
 48. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 245 (disputing the constitutionality of 
legislated interpretive rules). See generally Gluck, States As Laboratories, supra note 16 
(chronicling state court resistance to legislated interpretive rules). 
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dictates the decider.  Chevron‘s kind of institutional allocation rule (very 
similar to how the Erie doctrine allocates decision-making authority 
between state and federal courts49) may be more amenable to formalization 
than rules that go to the meaning of language. 
One punch line of this exposition, then, is that it may not be the inherent 
legal status of the canons of interpretation that is the problem; rather, it may 
be their substance.  What if, e.g., the presumption against preemption, 
instead of functioning as a principle of linguistic construction, functioned 
instead to shift the interpretation of an ambiguous statute to the states‘ 
discretion?  The rule of lenity is an interesting example in this regard.  
Lenity does effectively shift the decision to the criminal defendant:  the 
presumption is that ambiguous criminal laws are interpreted in favor of 
defendants.  It may be no surprise then, in light of the foregoing discussion, 
that judges tend to describe lenity in more ―lawlike‖ terms than they tend to 
describe the other canons of interpretation.  Many scholars consider lenity 
closer to a ―doctrine‖ (perhaps even a doctrine of constitutional law) than a 
―canon.‖50  Justice Scalia has so defended its legitimacy on several 
occasions.51 
II.   CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN THE CONTINGENCY 
OF THE REST OF THE CANONS 
But even as it differs from the other canons, Chevron‘s fate, in an 
important sense, rests on them:  Chevron and the other canons of 
interpretation are inextricably linked through Chevron‘s own formulation.  
Chevron‘s famous two-step provides: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  [n.9]  If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency‘s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.52 
As to the ascertainment of ambiguity, the opinion‘s also famous footnote 
9 sets out how judges are to go about their task:  ―If a court, employing 
 
 49. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:  The Executive’s Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (―Chevron is our Erie, and much of the time, it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the executive branch to say what the law is.‖). 
 50. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
399, 406 n.26 (2010) (―[Lenity] ‗reflects not merely a convenient maxim of statutory 
construction,‘ but rather ‗is rooted in fundamental principles of due process which mandate 
that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is 
prohibited.‘‖ (quoting Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979))). 
 51. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 296–97. 
 52. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted unless indicated). 
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traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an 
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must 
be given effect.‖53 
Chevron tells courts to defer to reasonable agency statutory 
interpretations if the statute is ambiguous, but it also tells courts that they 
first should attempt to resolve any ambiguities themselves using the 
―traditional tools of statutory construction.‖  The problem, however—which 
relates directly to the absence of general methodological stare decisis 
described in the previous part—is that the Court never sets out what those 
―traditional tools‖ are, likely because it could not agree on them if it wanted 
to. 
The result is that Chevron has become a punching bag for those who 
argue that courts are result-oriented in their approach to agency deference.  
William Eskridge and Connor Raso go so far as to challenge the idea that 
Chevron is a precedent in the first place because Chevron and its sister 
administrative deference doctrines are so inconsistently applied.54  
Nevertheless, the administrative law canons do have an effective 
―ranking‖—we know, e.g., that Curtiss-Wright deference (on national 
security matters)55 is stronger than Chevron, which is stronger than 
Skidmore,56 and so on.  On the other hand, we know little about whether the 
presumption against preemption is stronger than the presumption against 
implied repeals. 
These uncertainties about the relationships among the non-Chevron 
canons play out in the Chevron cases themselves.  The Court is divided 
about whether legislative history should be used to eliminate statutory 
ambiguity (and so preclude agency deference under Chevron), or whether 
policy-based canons like preemption might do so,57 and so the federal 
courts are generally inconsistent in their use of such canons at Step One.  
These disputes give Chevron a bad name, but understanding the statutory 
interpretation landscape makes clear that the disputes are not really about 
Chevron.  Rather, they reflect a lack of consensus on the Court about the 
other interpretive tools, even in the absence of an agency interpretation in 
the case. 
The Court rests Chevron‘s application on a finding of ―ambiguity‖ but 
has directed jurists to make that ambiguity determination with reference to a 
 
 53. Id. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added). 
 54. See generally Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 20. 
 55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 56. Skidmore, which preceded Chevron, was not the same kind of power-transferring 
deference doctrine as Chevron.  In Skidmore, the Court held that agency statutory 
interpretations should be given weight in accordance with their ―power to persuade,‖ but the 
courts retained ultimate interpretive authority. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944). 
 57. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008).  For example, if a statute is 
ambiguous with respect to preemption, the question is whether to defer to the agency‘s view 
under Chevron or ―clarify‖ the statute by applying the default no-preemption rule, thereby 
depriving the agency of discretion on that question. 
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category of legal tools—―traditional tools of statutory construction‖—that 
is murky at best, because the Court cannot agree on what the traditional 
tools of construction are, or in what order they should be applied, and 
because the Court will not treat any decision on such matters as carrying 
any kind of stare decisis effect.  Don‘t blame Chevron.  Blame the lack of 
methodological consensus in the federal courts when it comes to the rest of 
the interpretive principles. 
III.   CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE REALISM 
AND JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS 
Chevron and its progeny also radically differ from the other canons with 
respect to how very explicitly the Court has grappled with Chevron‘s basis 
and goals in ways it has not for the other presumptions.  This jurisprudential 
struggle has resulted in a Chevron approach that is now much more focused 
on how Congress actually works than is typical for the rest of the statutory 
interpretation rules. 
A.   There Is No Coherent Jurisprudential Basis for the Canons of 
Interpretation Outside of the Chevron Line of Cases 
Outside of the Chevron context, judges have justified the application of 
the canons on numerous and often conflicting grounds, all generally 
grouped under the very large umbrella concept that courts should act as 
―faithful agents‖ of the legislature.58  This has translated to arguments that 
the canons are legitimate because they (1) reflect how Congress drafts (e.g., 
the rule against superfluities); (2) help Congress draft better (e.g., the 
presumption against preemption); (3) are part of a shared set of background 
principles of which courts and Congress are each aware and mutually apply 
(e.g., clear statement rules); (4) impose beneficial, sometimes 
constitutional, policy norms on the legislative process (e.g., the rule of 
lenity); or (5) serve a ―rule of law‖ function (in the sense that they advance 
values of coherence, predictability, and notice (e.g., the presumption that 
statutory terms are used consistently throughout the U.S. Code).59 
Obviously not all of these functions are the same.  The claim that 
interpretive doctrines should merely reflect how Congress drafts posits a 
very different role for the judiciary than a claim that interpretive doctrines 
should aim to change congressional behavior or even impose values (like 
consistency or federalism) on legislation that Congress itself does not.  Nor 
has the Court disaggregated the individual canons and justified different 
canons on different grounds—for example, perhaps canons based on the 
Constitution do not require congressional awareness or use to be legitimate. 
Moreover, many of these justifications for the canons are based on 
empirical claims:  the idea that canons reflect how Congress actually drafts 
and that the canons set out ―clear statements‖ that Congress knows to use 
 
 58. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 913 (collecting sources). 
 59. For a more detailed discussion and examples from cases, see Gluck & Bressman, 
supra note 16, at 979–82. 
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are claims about the real world of legislative drafting, and yet the Court 
does not seem at all interested in verifying the accuracy of these 
assumptions.  Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner recently published a 500-
page treatise discussing more than seventy individual canons, including 
their bases in legislative drafting, without presenting any evidence of the 
actual federal statutory drafting process.60 
B.   Contrast the Progression from Chevron to Mead, and the Move Toward 
Legislative Realism in the Deference Context 
Enter Chevron.  It is true that Chevron, like the rest of the statutory 
interpretation canons, initially rested on a variety of not necessarily 
consistent normative bases.  The Chevron opinion itself set out a range of 
justifications for its new rule—justifications that extended from agencies‘ 
superior political accountability to the notion that Congress actually intends 
to delegate to agencies whenever statutes are ambiguous or silent.61  In the 
years after Chevron, the broad consensus was that Chevron‘s intent-based 
presumption—that any statutory ambiguity or silence signals congressional 
intent to delegation—was a fiction, although, to some, a benign one.62 
Then came Mead, in which the Court expressly grappled with whether 
Congress actually intends to delegate whenever a statute is ambiguous or 
silent.  The Court answered that question in the negative, and in the process 
significantly narrowed the Chevron presumption of delegation to apply only 
when Congress gives agencies formal lawmaking authority (and agencies 
use that authority).63 
One way to understand the march from Chevron to Mead is as an 
evolution from a broad and ambiguously justified approach to delegation to 
one focused on one particular justification—congressional intent to 
delegate—grounded in legislative reality.  Justice Souter‘s majority opinion 
in Mead begins with a recital of the many different ways in which Congress 
includes agencies in federal statutes and the many different ways in which 
agencies exercise the power that Congress gives them.  In Justice Souter‘s 
words, Mead is the Court‘s effort to ―tailor deference to [the] variety‖ of 
ways in which Congress delegates.64  So understood, Mead makes two 
critical moves:  (1) it realistically acknowledges that Congress designs 
statutory roles for agencies in myriad ways that a single interpretive 
presumption cannot capture, and (2) it argues that courts should try to 
reflect congressional practice, even if it comes in this variety of forms.  
Then-professors Barron and Kagan described Mead‘s holding as one that 
 
 60. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26. 
 61. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984). 
 62. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of 
Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009 (2011). 
 63. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (―We hold that 
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law . . . .‖). 
 64. Id. at 236. 
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firmly and exclusively grounds Chevron in congressional intent, calling it 
―the apotheosis of a developing trend in Chevron cases:  the treatment of 
Chevron as a congressional choice, rather than either a constitutional 
mandate or a judicial doctrine.‖65 
Return to the non-administrative law canons and consider how the 
Chevron-to-Mead doctrinal evolution exposes the flimsiness of their own 
jurisprudential bases.  Judges have not told us which interpretive doctrines 
must be pegged to congressional intent to be legitimate, nor have they 
acknowledged the dizzying variety in how Congress drafts.  As my recent 
empirical study of congressional drafting with Lisa Bressman details,66 
omnibus and non-omnibus statutes are very different animals (for example, 
legislative history and consistent-word usage play different roles in each).  
Statutes drafted by a single committee are different from statutes drafted by 
leadership or multiple committees acting together.  Appropriations statutes 
are different from authorization statutes, and so on.  Even the subject matter 
makes a difference, in the view of the drafting staff, with respect to what 
presumptions and drafting practices congressional drafters apply.  It may 
not be possible, or desirable, to craft an interpretive regime that actually 
reflects the complexities of this real-world drafting process.  But the point is 
that, in the Chevron context, the Court has worn these questions on its 
sleeve.  The Chevron-to-Mead doctrinal evolution has occasioned a 
vigorous public debate in the Court (mostly between Justices Breyer and 
Souter on the one side and Justice Scalia on the other) about how much 
doctrine should or does reflect congressional practice; how much 
complexity the system will tolerate; and the costs and benefits of tailored or 
transsubstantive interpretive rules67—questions that have long lurked far 
beneath the surface for the rest of statutory interpretation doctrine. 
C.   The Court Is Doing a Better Job Approximating 
How Congress Works with the Administrative Canons 
It therefore may come as little surprise that the Court seems to be doing a 
better job approximating how Congress delegates than approximating how 
Congress drafts.  The Gluck-Bressman study surveyed 137 congressional 
counsels on their familiarity with the judicial doctrines of interpretation and 
delegation and on whether the doctrines (regardless of staffer familiarity 
with them) substantially reflected the realities of the legislative drafting 
process.68  As we detailed, congressional staffers knew few of the non-
administrative law canons of statutory interpretation and rejected several 
 
 65. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201, 212. 
 66. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 979–82; Bressman & Gluck, supra note 
15, at 758–61. 
 67. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 236 (―If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial 
process of giving or withholding deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing 
discretionary administrative action must be declared irrelevant or minimized. . . .  Justice 
Scalia‘s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify.  The Court‘s choice has 
been to tailor deference to variety.‖). 
 68. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16. 
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that they did know (such as presumptions of consistent-term usage) as 
unrealistic assumptions about congressional drafting.69 
The administrative law canons, however, fared better.  For example, the 
rule announced in Mead, although the case was virtually unknown by name 
or as a doctrine that courts employ, was overwhelmingly validated as a 
good signal on which to rest assumptions about congressional delegation.  
Chevron was the most known of all the canons by name, and the majority 
of respondents said they understood Chevron‘s consequences when 
drafting.  Even some of the less generally known and hotly contested 
administrative law doctrines, such as the major questions rule (i.e., do not 
presume from mere ambiguity that Congress delegates major economic, 
policy, or political statements to agencies70), were validated by our 
respondents as realistic assumptions about delegation.71 
Why the Court seems to have done a better job in the administrative law 
context is a difficult question about which one can only hypothesize.  The 
current Court is packed with administrative law scholars, former D.C. 
Circuit judges, and former executive branch officials.  Only Justice Breyer 
has worked in the legislative branch, and there has not been a Justice on the 
Court who served in Congress since Justice Black retired in 1971.  As noted 
in Part I, it also seems relevant that the administrative law doctrines have 
been developed hand in hand with the regulatory state itself, in contrast to 
the ancient, ―cookie-cutter‖ rules of general interpretation. 
Regardless of the reason, Mead‘s apparently successful attempt to 
incorporate some realistic legislative signaling into interpretive doctrine 
challenges the Court either to do better when it comes to the rest of the 
canons, or to justify why it chooses not to do so.  One can see why the 
Court likes to say that all of its canons aim to reflect congressional practice:  
such an approach has obvious democratic legitimacy and legislative 
supremacy attractions.  What is more, to say that the canons merely reflect 
what Congress does is to say that the Court does not make them up—and I 
detailed in Part I the Court‘s strong resistance to acknowledging that the 
canons are judicially derived.   
But if the canons do not actually reflect congressional practice, then the 
Court needs to acknowledge where they are coming from (the Court?) and 
what they are doing.  There are good arguments to be made, for example, 
that federal courts should interpret statutes to be internally consistent even 
if Congress did not so intend—such an approach to statutory interpretation 
would rest on the importance of public notice or on the federal courts‘ role 
in cohering the corpus juris.72  Likewise, there are arguments to be made in 
 
 69. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 906, 924–64. 
 70. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). 
 71. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15, at 990–1014; cf. Christopher J. Walker, 
Chevron Inside the Regulatory State:  An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 
715–21 (2014) (finding similar understandings among agency personnel surveyed on many 
of the same questions utilized by Gluck and Bressman). 
 72. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 744 (2013) (―Consistency of 
interpretation of related state and federal laws is a virtue in that it helps to create simplicity 
making the law easier to understand and to follow for lawyers and for nonlawyers alike.‖); 
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support of courts interpreting statutes against the backdrop of 
constitutionally derived values, like federalism and lenity, that Congress 
might not have sufficiently considered.  The point is not to criticize these 
alternate approaches, but rather to press the Court to be clear about what 
should justify modern interpretive practice, as the Court has tried to do in 
the context of delegation. 
IV.   CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN ―DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING‖ (AND AS 
AN END RUN AROUND VERMONT YANKEE) 
Ever since 1892, when the Court held in Field v. Clark73 that, ―an 
enrolled act, thus authenticated, is sufficient evidence of itself . . . that it 
passed Congress,‖74 federal courts have refused to enter the sausage 
factory.  That is, they have refused to consider whether Congress engages in 
―due process of lawmaking‖—for example, whether Congress was 
sufficiently deliberate or transparent in the enactment of legislation—in 
evaluating a statute‘s legitimacy or its meaning.75  This position has 
arguably taken on greater significance in recent years, as extreme 
congressional gridlock has occasioned a rise of what political scientist 
Barbara Sinclair calls ―unorthodox lawmaking‖—the increased use of 
legislative maneuvers such as closed-door summits and omnibus (bundled) 
legislation that make the legislative process less transparent and result in 
statutes that can be quite messy even as they increase in complexity.76 
A.   Mead, However, Is a Due Process of Lawmaking Decision 
But here, again, Chevron provides an exception.  Mead, although not 
commonly conceptualized in this fashion, is a ―due process of lawmaking‖ 
decision when considered from the perspective of statutory interpretation 
doctrine.  In Mead, the Court effectively told Congress that if it wants 
deference for an agency delegate, the agency must be given the power to 
make law through the transparent and deliberative notice-and-comment 
 
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment) (―The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the 
basis of which meaning is . . . most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which 
the provision must be integrated . . . .‖); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 252 (―[T]he 
body of the law should make sense, and . . . it is the responsibility of the courts, within the 
permissible meanings of the text, to make it so.‖); Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in 
Statutory Interpretation:  Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to 
Omnibus Legislation, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 1, 2002, at 7, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1 (subscription required). See generally William W. 
Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 
(2000) (elaborating on Justice Scalia‘s views of the judicial obligation to impose coherence 
on the U.S. Code). 
 73. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 74. Id. at 672. 
 75. See generally Linde, supra note 9. 
 76. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING:  NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2012); Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14. 
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process provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.77  And the agency 
has to use it.  As Justice Scalia commented in his Mead dissent, if the Court 
were concerned only with finding a clear signal of congressional intent to 
delegate, then looking for the delegation of lawmaking power from 
Congress would have been enough.78  Requiring the agency to use that 
power adds something more to the Mead opinion. 
The Court in Mead was adding something that it had not felt comfortable 
doing as a matter of constitutional law in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.79  In Vermont Yankee, the 
Court held that it was beyond the power of the federal courts to add 
procedural requirements to agency statutory implementation beyond the 
requirements set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.80  Mead, 
however, accomplishes close to the same result in a more indirect fashion, 
encouraging agencies to use formal procedures if they want their 
interpretations to get deference.  The question is why, here too, the Court 
seems more willing to grapple with the same ideas in the Chevron 
context—in this case, ideas about which policymaking procedures produce 
more legitimate outcomes—that it continues to avoid when it comes to the 
rest of the canons. 
B.   Mead (Like Some Other Canons) As ―Backdoor‖ Constitutional Law 
We also see in Mead the Court trying to affect congressional behavior 
through the ―softer‖ mode of regulatory law in ways that it does not feel 
comfortable doing through the sharper edge of constitutional doctrine.  
Thus conceptualized, Mead bears resemblance to how some scholars have 
described the Court‘s use of certain other interpretive rules, most 
prominently, the statutory interpretation ―clear statement rules.‖  Clear 
statement rules require from Congress what are essentially magic words 
before courts will interpret statutes to tread on constitutional values—for 
example, the requirement that Congress must be explicit when it wishes to 
abrogate sovereign immunity or intrude on traditional state functions.81  As 
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have put it, the Court has used these 
rules to make ―backdoor‖ constitutional law in precisely those areas in 
which the Court has decided, as a constitutional matter, it should not 
intervene.82 
This comparison to clear statement rules makes even clearer that Mead is 
an end run around Vermont Yankee.  The Court accomplished through 
interpretive doctrine what it could not accomplish through constitutional 
 
 77. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the notice and public comment procedures 
required for federal rulemaking). 
 78. Mead, 533 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 80. Id. at 543. 
 81. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
 82. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:  Clear 
Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992). 
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law, much in the same way that the Court‘s creation of a new ―federalism‖ 
clear statement rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft83 offered the states the 
protection from congressional intrusion that the Court had held, just six 
years earlier, the Constitution could not offer.84 
And, in return, Mead highlights the due-process-of-lawmaking features 
of the other canons of interpretation.  Consider again the clear statement 
rules, which generally have not been conceptualized as a due-process-of-
lawmaking regime.  A Court concerned that Congress is not sufficiently 
deliberative when it comes to, e.g., decisions of federal-state relations, 
might address that concern by creating an extra legislative hurdle—a 
requirement of a clear statutory statement for any statutory change to the 
federalism status quo—to make Congress pause or encourage explicit 
debate on the subject.  Like Mead, and in light of Mead, such presumptions 
look much more like judicial attempts to affect the lawmaking process, 
despite the Court‘s stated resistance to doing anything of the sort. 
V.   CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN SUBSTANTIVE STATUTORY PRECEDENTS—
AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN THE STATUTORY ERA 
Chevron also has a lot to tell us about how the Court sees its role—and 
how that role is changing—in the modern statutory state.  One way to see 
this is to look at the next major administrative deference case after Mead:  
Brand X—a 2005 decision with enormous repercussions for the allocation 
of power between courts and agencies. 
A.   Is the Court Really Ready to Give Away All of This Power? 
In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that agency statutory interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes sometimes could, and indeed should, displace judicial 
precedents on what those statutes mean—perhaps even U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents.85  This is a ―WOW‖ moment.  Brand X is arguably the capstone 
of the Court‘s Chevron evolution:  it works a wholesale transfer of statutory 
interpretation authority from federal courts to agencies.  Not since the 
famous Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins86 case have we seen the Court 
giving away so much of its power to a different institutional legal actor. 
Well before Brand X, Cass Sunstein already had called Chevron our 
generation‘s Erie doctrine.87  When Erie was decided, at the dawn of the 
 
 83. 501 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1991). 
 84. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985). 
 85. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005) (―A court‘s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
agency discretion.‖). 
 86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 87. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006) (―Chevron can 
be seen in this light as a close analogue to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins—as a suggestion 
that law and interpretation often involve no ‗brooding omnipresence in the sky‘ but instead 
discretionary judgments to be made by appropriate institutions.‖ (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. 
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
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New Deal era, it was state courts that received the transfer of law-deciding 
power; in the modern era of the regulatory state, it is federal agencies.  
Brand X, however, makes the Erie link even more explicit than Chevron 
alone.  As Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss each have noted, just as 
Erie held that state, not federal, courts have the final word on interpretations 
of state law, the doctrine announced in  Brand X effectively turns many 
judicial statutory interpretations into ―provisional precedents‖: judicial 
interpretations sit provisionally in place until an agency interpretation 
displaces them.88 
The big-picture question is whether, when it comes to statutory cases, the 
Court is really comfortable giving away so much of the store.  Erie took 
away from courts similar swaths of power:  most of the common law 
landscape comes from the state-law doctrines that Erie told federal courts to 
stop making themselves.  But coming at the same time as the New Deal, 
Erie simply cleared the federal courts‘ plate for an arguably even bigger 
meal:  the major statutes of the modern regulatory state.  Today, by 
contrast, no new area of federal law waits in the wings to fill the void left 
by the transfer of federal statutory interpretation to agencies. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court thus seems conflicted about the current state of 
affairs—about its place, its powers, and the role of the federal courts in the 
modern statutory world.  The Court seems to be grappling with questions 
about its own status and the status of the law that it makes in today‘s 
regulatory state, and there is a tension between how much power the 
Justices desire to give to agencies and how much they want to keep. 
These tensions are on display when we look at the rest of the doctrinal 
landscape of precedent in the statutory interpretation context.  In a series of 
opinions, the Court has emphasized that statutory interpretation opinions 
get ―super strong stare decisis‖—a higher level of stare decisis than the 
usual mode.89  The justification has generally rested on separation of 
powers:  once a court speaks on a statutory matter, it is up to Congress, in 
the interest of legislative supremacy, to decide how to react.90  Some cases 
also have emphasized reliance interests in support of super strong stare 
decisis for statutory precedents, particularly when it comes to statutes 
governing business, markets, or property.91  But, as Brand X illustrates, 
 
 88. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent:  Protecting Flexibility in 
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1310–11 (2002) (presaging Brand 
X); Peter L. Strauss, ―Deference‖ Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them ―Chevron Space‖ and 
―Skidmore Weight,‖ 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1169 (2012). 
 89. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) 
(―[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‗special force‘ . . . .‖ (quoting 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989))); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 
258, 280–82 (1972) (refusing to overrule several earlier cases involving baseball‘s 
exemption from federal antitrust laws); Gluck, supra note 25, at 1917–18. 
 90. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327 (2005). 
 91. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 139 (reasoning in a statutory interpretation case that 
―even if the Government cannot show detrimental reliance on our earlier cases, our 
reexamination of well-settled precedent could nevertheless prove harmful‖ because ―[t]o 
overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that decision is 
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when agencies are involved, the Court takes a completely different tack.  
Brand X thus bifurcates the world of substantive statutory precedents:  
agencies can change their minds and even effectively change some judge-
made precedents whereas, for courts, their statutory precedents are ossified. 
But the Court has not been able to go all the way.  Many court watchers 
read Brand X in shock.  Would the United States Supreme Court really 
allow a federal agency to overrule one of its own opinions?  Justice Stevens 
concurred specially (but alone) in Brand X to carve out an exception for the 
Court‘s own precedents.92  Perhaps not surprisingly, when confronted 
directly with that question in the next major case, United States v. Home 
Concrete & Supply,93 the Court punted and so lived to fight another day. 
B.   Other Statutory Precedent Doctrines That Hoard Power for the Court 
The Court has also engaged in more subtle attempts to retain interpretive 
power.  Many of the ways in which the Court deploys its own doctrines of 
precedent in the statutory interpretation context, agencies aside, seem to be 
attempts to retain a central role for courts.  Consider in this regard the lack 
of methodological stare decisis discussed in Part I; or the Court‘s stingy 
treatment of congressional overrides of statutory decisions, which Deborah 
Widiss has documented;94 or its retention of emphasis on the common law 
(which of course is made by judges).  Refusing to treat interpretive 
methodology as law, for example, means that Congress can‘t overrule it.  
Giving congressional overrides their narrowest construction retains as much 
as possible of the previous judicial decision.  Retaining a series of outdated 
default presumptions that statutes are to be interpreted against the backdrop 
of the common law and that when statutes are ambiguous the common law 
principle controls is a last grasp at judicial power, as Justice Scalia and 
Judge Posner each have charged.95 
 
no longer ‗right‘ . . . could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty 
for necessary legal stability‖). 
 92. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―While I join the Court‘s opinion in full, I add this caveat 
concerning Part III-B, which correctly explains why a court of appeals‘ interpretation of an 
ambiguous provision in a regulatory statute does not foreclose a contrary reading by the 
agency.  That explanation would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this Court 
that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.‖). 
 93. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).  Home Concrete involved a pre-Chevron interpretation of a 
tax statute by the Court that was later interpreted, post-Chevron, differently by the IRS.  The 
Court punted the question by holding that since the earlier case was pre-Chevron, the Court‘s 
descriptions of the statutory ambiguity should not be taken in the official Chevron sense.  
Instead, the Court held that had the earlier case come to the Court post-Chevron, the Court 
would have held that the statute was not ambiguous, thereby leaving no room for the 
alternate agency interpretation even if Brand X applied to the Supreme Court. See id. at 
1843–44. 
 94. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:  Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 518–28 (2009). 
 95. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 318 (calling this canon ―a relic of the 
courts‘ historical hostility to the emergence of statutory law‖); SCALIA, supra note 40, at 29 
(calling this canon a ―sheer judicial power-grab‖).  Judge Posner also recently called the 
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Brand X of course tugs in the opposite direction, and we see the Court 
struggling with the decision.  Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent in City of 
Arlington v. FCC96—perhaps not un-coincidentally the first major 
administrative deference case after Home Concrete—is one of the more 
explicit statements of concern that the Court has been overly generous:  ―It 
would be a bit much to describe the result [of Chevron] as ‗the very 
definition of tyranny,‘ but the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.‖97 
VI.   CHEVRON AS A STUDY IN THE END OF ―SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK!‖ 
(OR, CHEVRON:  THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS) 
One thing Chevron does share with most other statutory interpretation 
doctrines is ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖  Mead is an important exception—a 
recognition that Congress delegates in a variety of complex and diverging 
ways.  But most other aspects of Chevron-Mead share with the non-
administrative interpretive doctrines the outdated assumption of a textbook 
legislative process that rarely exists today, if it ever did.  The doctrines 
generally assume that statutes are drafted by a single or cohesive group of 
people; that when there is a delegation it is to one, federal, agency; and that 
statutes progress from committee, to floor, to vote, to conference just as the 
cartoon taught us. 
It‘s time to bid adieu to this old familiar tale—and that is a project not 
only for Chevron‘s next thirty years but for the broader statutory context as 
well.  Sinclair has documented the rise of ―unorthodox lawmaking‖98—
pervasive deviations of the legislative process from the ―Schoolhouse 
Rock!‖ model to, e.g., omnibus deals involving multiple congressional 
committees; bills that sometimes bypass committee altogether in favor of 
off-the-record summits between party leaders and the executive branch; and 
countless other process deviations that I have further developed elsewhere, 
with Anne Joseph O‘Connell and Rosa Po.99  The Gluck-Bressman 
empirical study also confirms that congressional staff are acutely aware of 
these changes and view them as having a significant impact both on how 
statutes are drafted and on the tools that courts should use to interpret them.  
For instance, common interpretive tools, like legislative history or 
presumptions that statutes are drafted with internal coherence and 
consistency of language, have more relevance in statutes with a linear 
 
canon a ―fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English judges to legislation.‖ Liu v. 
Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Gluck, supra note 13, at 811. 
 96. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 97. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting The FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).  Arlington 
held that Chevron deference was available to agencies‘ interpretations of their own 
jurisdiction—a question that the Court had hinted in earlier cases was one of those ―major 
questions‖ that agencies should not be presumed to be delegated. Id. at 1868. 
 98. SINCLAIR, supra note 76. 
 99. See Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14 (introducing six categories of unorthodox 
lawmaking and analogous unorthodox administrative processes). 
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process than in omnibus bills.100  But this real-world description has no legs 
when it comes to the doctrines actually in play. 
On the agency side, unorthodox lawmaking leads to what my coauthors 
and I have called ―unorthodox delegations‖ and ―unorthodox 
rulemaking.‖101  Statutes drafted by multiple committees often delegate, in 
overlapping fashion, to multiple agencies precisely because each committee 
wants its own agency in the game.102  Statutes that address particularly 
controversial issues often punt difficult policy questions not only to federal 
agencies but outside of the federal government entirely—to state 
administrators and even private actors—thereby allowing the feds to deflect 
some accountability.103  But there is no Chevron analogue for multiple 
federal implementers,104 or for any implementers that are not federal 
agencies,105 even though there is now some empirical evidence that 
Congress sometimes intends to delegate to multiple implementers 
simultaneously and even to outside entities like states.106  Nor have the 
Chevron cases begun to consider how the rise of unorthodox rulemaking—
agencies‘ use of atypical and non-APA-derived policymaking practices—
should affect questions of administrative deference.107 
Here, the Chevron context is simply one instance of the broader 
phenomenon.  As I have detailed elsewhere, for example, statutory 
interpretation doctrine shares Chevron‘s federal-law myopia—the persistent 
and incorrect assumption that the only actors who create and interpret 
federal law are federal actors.108  But a challenge for the next thirty years of 
Chevron (and the rest) is to find a way to capture—or to justify ignoring—
the overlapping complexity of the modern administrative state.  For 
example, in addition to the need for deference rules that take into account 
multiple, nonfederal implementers (even if those rules ultimately reject 
deference), one wonders how these other nuances of unorthodox lawmaking 
 
 100. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 15, at 758–63 (discussing the unorthodox lawmaking 
procedures in legislation); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 936–37, 979–81 (detailing 
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 101. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O‘Connell, The Lost World of Administrative 
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014) (detailing how the textbook story of administrative law is 
no more); Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14; Rosa Po, Unorthodox Rulemaking 
(unpublished note) (on file with author) (analogizing between rulemaking and Barbara 
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 102. See generally ROBERT KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS:  HOW AMERICA‘S ESSENTIAL 
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1131 (2012). 
 103. Gluck, supra note 14, at 602–03. 
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2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 207. 
 105. See generally Gluck, supra note 14. 
 106. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 1006–11 (describing respondents‘ 
understanding of delegation to multiple agencies and/or state implementers). 
 107. See Gluck, O‘Connell & Po, supra note 14. 
 108. Gluck, supra note 14, at 537–38, 551–64. 
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affect delegation.  For instance:  Are agencies more attentive to differences 
across statutes than are courts?  Do agencies discount legislative history in 
omnibus vehicles, as the Gluck-Bressman drafters suggested interpreters 
should?  (If so, where do agencies get their directives for such statutes, 
since many agency directives currently appear in committee reports?)  Does 
the fact that many major statutes are now managed by leadership, rather 
than by committee, reduce or increase the agency‘s role in the drafting 
process and the delegation it ultimately receives? 
It also is evident that those statutes that go through an unorthodox 
legislative process (for example, the increasing tendency to skip the 
conference committee stage, where statutes are cleaned up) are less 
consistent textually, because they often bundle together multiple acts and 
also may be more likely to contain mistakes.  Those features may trigger 
Chevron ambiguity in ways that Congress never expected or intended.  
Should agencies be given more latitude to correct mistakes when statutes go 
through exceedingly unorthodox processes? 
Consider Chevron itself and the assumptions that it makes about the 
Congress-court-agency relationship.  Right now, Chevron is a very court-
centered doctrine precisely because of its link to statutory interpretation.  
Chevron deference depends on ambiguity, but Chevron ambiguity depends 
in large part on the application of the court-created presumptions of 
interpretation.  Chevron assumes that Congress is talking the language of 
courts, and talking to courts, when it signals delegation.  But what if 
Congress is actually talking to agencies?  The Gluck-Bressman findings 
substantiate the intuition that most scholars of the modern administrative 
state will have:  in today‘s regulatory environment, Congress is focused 
primarily on agencies, not on courts.  Agencies are Congress‘s immediate, 
frequent, and ongoing statutory interpreters.  Because courts are involved, if 
at all, much more rarely and usually further down the line, they are not on 
typically on Congress radar to the extent that courts seem to expect. 
But if congressional drafters themselves do not know the canons and if 
many of those doctrines do not reflect actual drafting practice, how can 
Chevron‘s canon-based test really effectuate congressional intent to 
delegate?  The Gluck-Bressman drafters told us that they use different 
signals to communicate with agencies—for instance, directives in 
legislative history or linguistic signaling conventions (―X in consultation 
with Y,‖ e.g., to indicate which agency takes the lead)—that courts 
generally do not consider.  Indeed, these signals of delegation may be 
present even when statutory text is ―clear‖ (and thus even when the 
Chevron test, as the courts utilize it, would not find delegation).  Wouldn‘t 
a truly modern Chevron doctrine follow further down the path of Mead and 
look to signals of how Congress talks to agencies rather than hinge on 
doctrinal guideposts used by courts? 
Finally—and this is a big one—consider in this light the link between 
how Congress and agencies talk to one another and the Brand X case 
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discussed in Part V.  If Professors Bamberger and Strauss are correct109 
(and I think they are) that Brand X turns judicial interpretations into Erie-
like provisional precedents awaiting agency interpretation of the statute, 
why shouldn‘t the courts approach statutory interpretation in those 
circumstances as agencies would?  In other words, if Erie requires federal 
courts interpreting state statutes to use the relevant state‘s interpretive 
methodologies (as I think it does),110 why shouldn‘t federal courts, 
interpreting federal statutes before an agency interpretation arises apply 
them as agencies would? 
Numerous scholars have documented how ―agency statutory 
interpretation‖ is far more purposive, expert, aggressive, and political than 
judicial interpretation.111  But no one has yet suggested that federal courts 
take that same approach when they are standing in for federal agencies 
under Brand X:  that is, to decide statutory questions with the same 
political, expert, and/or interpretive mindset that we expect from ―agency 
statutory interpretation.‖112  That would be another ―WOW‖ moment.  
(Would textualist judges use legislative history because an agency would?  
Would left-wing judges pick a right-wing interpretation because the 
President espouses that view?)  But arguably it follows from the Brand X 
rule, if that rule survives the next thirty years.  At a minimum, the question 
deserves some engagement. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevron is the doctrinal apotheosis of the modern legal era.  It signals a 
resounding shift of the center of the law‘s gravity away from judge-made 
law toward statutes and their primary administrators.  It therefore should 
come as no surprise that thirty years of Chevron have lessons beyond the 
administrative law context—specifically, lessons about the evolving and 
uncertain role of the federal courts in the modern statutory landscape. 
It seems as though the statutory era has suddenly caught up with the 
federal courts.  The courts may not have needed determinate statutory 
interpretation doctrines, or doctrines whose legal bases and sources were 
thoroughly understood, when statutory cases were the exception.  
Understanding legislative behavior was perhaps not as important, and 
certainly Congress itself operated with less complexity.  Similarly, while in 
the abstract it may make sense for democratically-accountable and 
expertise-driven agencies to be able to change their minds as politics and 
policy change, when laid next to more our general notion of precedent—
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which is perhaps the central institutional feature of a common law judicial 
system—the implications of the abrogation of statutory stare decisis are 
potentially earth-shattering.  How the federal courts will resolve these 
challenges for the law of legislation remains to be seen; the courts are still 
finding their way.  But thirty years of Chevron put many of the challenges 
in a new light. 
